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MINERAL VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES
By JOHN P. HORGAN*
With increasing frequency the lawyer and the mining engineer are
being called upon to participate in contested eminent domain cases where
the land appropriated contains mineral deposits.
The problem of setting a value upon land and its components is a
perplexing one since "market value" is the yardstick in eminent domain
proceedings. Many mining men, however, think in terms of speculative
values and, as we shall see, this approach does not satisfy the legal tests
applied in condemnation cases. It becomes our task, therefore, to see how the
law attempts to reconcile the miner's speculative value concept with the
market value concept.
The valuation approach to be outlined here applies to all types of
mineral, metallic and non-metallic, and is equally applicable to other nat-
ural attachments to land, such as growing trees that have value as commercial
timber.
The general field of condemnation law-has been reasonably well charted
by such legal navigators as Lewis, Nichols and Orgel. Yet in daily practice
we find many rocks and shoals which are unmarked upon any legal map.
This is largely true of mineral valuation for condemnation.
Case law in California on the subject of mineral valuation is in
condemnation cases almost non-existent. There is, however, a considerable
body of law in the Federal Reports and in the jurisprudence of some of
the other states.
The Governing Law
It is well to begin with the fundamental principle, long established in
California, that the measure of damages to which a property owner is
entitled in condemnation is the market value of the property.1
The leading California case, Sacramento Railroad Co. v. Heilbron2
announces the classical definition of market value in these words:
".... the measure of this damage (for land actually taken for public
use) is the market value; that is to say, the highest price estimated in terms
of money which the land would bring if exposed for sale in the open market,
with reasonable time allowed in which to find a purchaser, buying with
knowledge of all the uses and purposes to which it was adapted and for
which it was capable."53
In estimating this compensation the test is not value for a special
purpose but fair value in view of all the purposes to which the property is
* BS. 1936, LL.B. 1947, University of San Francisco; member, San Francisco Bar.
1 Oakland v. Parker, 70 CaLApp. 295, 233 Pac. 68 (1924).
2156 Cal. 408, 104 Pac. 979 (1909).
Id. at 409, 104 Pac. at 980.
(163)
naturally adapted. Such uses, however, do not include remote or speculative
possibilities.'
East Bay Municipal Utility District v. Kiefler5 illustrates this point:
"Speculative and conjectural calculations of prospective receipts and
expenditures and consequent profits to be derived from a prospective enter-
prise not only throw no light on the issue of the market value of the land
• . . but operate to confuse and mislead the minds of the jurors."6
Attempts have often been made, in cases where the land condemned
contains valuable mineral deposits, to estimate the fair market value in
either one of two ways:
1. By showing the gross mineral content of the land involved, and
multiplying the total of the mineral deposit by a fixed price per unit.
This method has been condemned by reasoning that the estimate as to
the quantity and quality of the material in the land constitutes mere specu-
lation and furthermore, even if such amount could be exactly ascertained
the costs of mining and the profits made therefrom would still be uncertain
and speculative since the contingencies of the business could not be estimated
with any fair degree of certainty.7
2. In other cases attempts have been made to prove the market value
of the mineral deposits, aside from the value of the land, by reference
to profits which had been or might be realized from making use of the mineral
deposits independently. This method has not met with success in the courts.
As to evidence of past profits where an operating mining facility is being
condemned, the court in Los Angeles v. Deacon,' held that the admission of
evidence of the net profit derived from the operation of the rock and
gravel plant being condemned was prejudicial error and not a proper basis
on which to predicate market value.
In discussing the Deacon case, Orgel makes this statement:
"A fortiori, it is error to consider testimony based on assumptions as
to annual productivity over a long period of years, fixed future costs of pro-
duction and sale prices of the quarry product."9
The courts have had occasion to comment on the attempt to introduce
evidence of the probable profits to be derived from a prospective mining
operation and have condemned this attempt as pure speculation."
Yolo Water and Power Co. v. Hudson, 182 Cal. 48, 186 Pac. 772 (1920).
99 Cal.App. 240, 278 Pac. 476 (1929).
Id. at 250, 278 Pac. at 480.
Hollister v. Cox, 131 Conn. 523, 41 A.2d 93 (1945) ; Orleans County Quarry Co. v. State,
172 N.Y. App. Div. 863, 159 N.Y. Supp. 30 (1916) ; Chicago M. & St. P. Ry Co. v. Mason, 23 S.D.
564, 122 N.W. 601 (1909).
8 119 Cal.App. 491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932).
' ORGEL, VALUATION UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN, at 543 (1953).
"0 Sparkill Realty v. State, 268 N.Y. 192, 197 N.E. 192 (1935) ; Kansas City v. Bacon, 157 Mo.
450, 57 S.W. 1045 (1900) ; Sanitary Dist. v. Loughran, 160 Ill. 362, 43 N.E. 359 (1896).
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It is clear, therefore, that evidence of past or prospective profits is not in
accord with the yardstick of market value and are not admissible either to
prove or to support the value estimate.
The reasoning of the courts in rejecting evidence of profits, whether
past or prospective, is apparently based upon the conviction that their
use would necessarily open the door to an exhaustive investigation of the
accounting system of the operator, the cost of the plant installation, deprecia-
tion, obsolescence, depletion, the stability of demand in the market, the
prospect of technological improvements which might outmode the product
being produced and other innumerable inquiries which would only compound
speculation. It is true, of course, that a witness who has given an opinion
on market value may be asked on cross-examination if he knew of the profit
returned in the past mining operation and what importance, if any, he
attached to it. Questions such as these, however, are permitted only for the
purpose of testing the credibility of the witness, the extent of his investigation
and the value of his opinion. They are not permitted for the purpose of
etsablishing a figure which can be used by the court or jury in arriving at
market value."
The mining engineer is faced with a somewhat different problem when
he seeks to place a market value upon lands which contain valuable mineral
deposits but which have not been theretofore exploited or worked. When
such a property is taken in condemnation and contains valuable deposits the
existence of the geological features can be taken into account so far as they
affect the market value of the land, but in such instances the mineral deposits
cannot be separately determined and valued independent of the land of which
they are a part. The deposits cannot be considered as so much potential
merchandise and valued as such. The land must be valued as land with the
presence of the mineral deposits being given proper consideration. The
ultimate inquiry is what an informed purchaser in the market would pay
for the land having knowledge of the existence of these valuable deposits
which are component parts of the land itself.
Therefore, within the market value concept it is proper for the land-
owner to testify to the existence of these mineral deposits and he may even
testify to the estimated quantity, extent and character of the deposit." The
existence of mineral deposits or other natural resources is an element to be
considered in arriving at the market value of the property, but it is the
extent to which these natural components enhance the value of the land, if at
all, that is to be considered and not their value as so many cubic yards or so
many board feet of merchandise.
"-Los Angeles v. Deacon, 119 Cal.App. 491, 7 P.2d 378 (1932) ; Buckhannon Ry. Co. v. Great
Scott Coal & Coke Co., 75 W. Va. 423, 83 S.E. 1031 (1914) ; Gole v. Elwood Power Co., 216 Pa.
307, 65 AtI. 678 (1907). NicuoLs, EMINENT DOMAIN § 13:22 (3d ed. 1950).
'1 United States v. 342.81 Acres of Land, 134 F. Supp. 430 (N.D. Ga. 1955).
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Nichols, writing on eminent domain, sums this point up in this
language:
"In applying the valuation process to mineral deposits in place, it has
been held improper to determine the value thereof by using the product of
the estimated amount of the deposit and a fixed price per unit. In the first
place the estimate as to quantity has been considered too speculative and
uncertain to merit consideration. In view of the contingencies and uncer-
tainties of business in general, there can, in such case, be no certain estimate
of the cost and potential profits. Undoubtedly, proof as to the quantity and
quality of a mineral deposit is important as is also the cost of extracting it
and processing it for the market. However, these are elements only to be
considered with others in determining the value of the property. There is
no limit to the value of a quarry or sand bank or clay bank, if an estimate can
be made of the amount of stone, sand, or clay which can be taken, and a fixed
price put upon it."'13
The case often cited to illustrate the inadmissibility of evidence which
attempts to value the mineral or other natural resources separately from
the land is Ross v. Commissioners of Palisades Interstate Park. 4 In this
case the land under condemnation was wild and unoccupied, the upland
being covered with small trees, underbrush and stones, and the whole tract
being underlain with slate and sandstone. At the trial evidence was offered
as to the value of the stone in place, and on appeal, it was urged that the
admission of this evidence was error. The court used the following language
in disposing of that contention:
"It was not error to exclude evidence as to the value of the stone in place,
under the case of Manda v. Delaware, etc. R.R. Co., 98 Atl. 467. The stone in
place is a part of the land. It cannot be valued separately and apart from
the land. To what extent, if any, the value of the land is enhanced by the
stone may be shown. The value of the land as stone land suitable for
quarrying is a proper subject of consideration both by the witnesses and the
jury in fixing the amount of just compensation to be awarded, but not the
value of the stone separately and apart from the land. The value of the land
is not measured by such facts. The stone is a component part of the land."
(Emphasis added.) 15
Another interesting case is United States v. 13.40 acres of land in City
of Richmond, Contra Costa County, California.6 This case involved the
condemnation by the federal government of property in the city of Richmond
which contained rock material suitable for building and construction. At
the time of the condemnation the owners were operating the property as a
quarry and removing the building rock. After the taking, the United States
Maritime Commission continued the operations and removed the rock for
wartime shipyard construction. The method of valuation used by witnesses
'8 NicHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 13:22 (3d ed. 1950).1' 90 N.J.L. 461, 101 Ad. 60 (1917).
' Id. at 467, 101 AH. at 63.56 F. Supp. 535 (N.D. Cal. 1944).
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for the owner, was condemned by the court, as fully appears from the
following excerpt from the case:
"The record clearly discloses that both of the expert witnesses produced
by defendants based their estimates of market value of this land upon data
and factors of a speculative and conjectural nature, which cannot, under well
established principles, be taken into account in the determination of market
value. Both Mr. Gabriel and Mr. Maiden appraised the land upon the basis
of returns inuring to the defendants out of future sales of the rock material.
Both made inquiries and investigations with respect to the production, trans-
portation and sale of rock material. Predicated thereon, they estimated the
selling price in the future of the rock material and then made deductions by
way of expenses for blasting, trucking, general operating expenses, allowance
for risks and other unforeseen business contingencies, and then, upon that
concept, proffered their opinions as to the market value of the property.
What they really did was to appraise the present value of the anticipated
profits from the sale of the rock material and not the market value of the
land itself as of the date of the taking. Such a modus of evaluation is not
according to proper standards of criteria legally approved in the determina-
tion of market value.
'The separate valuation of timber or rock attached to land, or valuations
arrived at by a process of multiplying the number of cubic feet or yards by a
given price per unit, are not approved bases for evaluation. United States
v. Indian Creek Marble Co., 40 F. Supp. 811 (Emphasis added)."17
A well recognized and frequently cited case in New York is that of
Sparkill Realty Corp. v. State."8 There the witnesses went the full distance
in conjecture and speculation in their approach to market value. The court's
reaction thereto appears in the following excerpt:
"The claimants submitted no proof of the market value of the land as
such. Instead they offered evidence that above mean high-water mark on
the property are 15,314,221 cubic yards of quarriable trap rock which would
yield 27,365,997 cubic yards of broken stone of a quality up to standards
prescribed for customary uses of trap rock, and evidence that by an addi-
tional expenditure of $503,471.30, the plant of the claimant lessees could
have been equipped to quarry, crush, store, and load on scows 750,000 cubic
yards of crushed stone annually. These facts were then assumed in a hypo-
thetical question put to each of four expert witnesses for the claimants. The
further form of the hypothesis was as follows:
"'Assume the stone could be quarried, crushed and loaded on scows at
the quarry at an average cost of 70 cents and at an average freight cost of
40 cents per cubic yard, or a total of $1.10 per cubic yard, delivered in scows
alongside docks in the Metropolitan New York and New Jersey district, which
cost includes maintenance, taxes, depreciation and depletion. Assume
750,000 cubic yards of broken stone at least from this quarry can be marketed
in this district annually at an average price of $1.90 per cubic yard along-
side docks in scows. What, in your opinion, was the market value of the
property and existing improvements on the day of entry and appropriation
Id. at 538.
lB268 N.Y. 192, 197 N.E. 192 (1935).
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• . . that is to say, the amount in cash which a willing purchaser would
pay and a willing seller would take?'"
The testimony so elicited appraised the value of the property in figures
ranging from $4,331,027.30 to $4,800,000.
"This procedure in itself proved nothing. As long ago was said of
similar testimony:
" 'All the witness has done, is to establish, by calculation, that such a
stock, from such a time, will produce so much. He does not himself prove
any fact, and the calculations he has made must therefore depend upon the
facts which are proved by others.' Erskine, L.C. in Lord Melville's Trial,
29 How. St. Trials, 1066; 1 Wigmore on Evidence, 2d Ed. Sec. 672.
"The hypothetical question, although in the end it called for testimony in
the guise of opinions as to market value, could have been answered only on
the fixed assumption that the property of the claimants was to have been
operated for a generation at an annual profit of half a million dollars ...
Opinion testimony may not be predicated on a sequence of conjectures.
(Lamp v. Union R. Co., 195 N.Y. 260, 88 N.E. 371.)
"This quarry had never been worked. Before the taking, a willing buyer
could have acquired at best an unfinished plant and the opportunity to
operate it after completion. To the full market value of the privilege the
claimants were entitled, but to nothing more. (Citing cases.)" 19
Another case which illustrates an extension of the attempt made in the
Sparkill case is New York Central R. R. Co. v. Maloney2" in which the court
lays down the accepted measure of compensation in the condemnation of
property which contains mineral or other deposits. At the trial the defendant
was permitted to establish by several witnesses that borings made upon
the lands disclosed deposits of clay and sand adapted for the manufacture
of brick; that brick yards could be established upon the northerly and
southerly tracts, buildings erected, machinery installed, and, as to the
number of millions of brick that might be produced annually, that a suitable
dock for shipment might be erected, that the land thus improved could be
utilized for the manufacture of brick upon a royalty rental basis, and that a
tenant would pay 10% annually upon the cost of the improvement and a fur-
ther royalty of from 40% to 60o per thousand on brick manufactured. The
judgment of the lower court was reversed and the true measure of damages
is announced by the court in the following excerpt:
"The measure of compensation in a proceeding like the present one
is the fair market value of the land before the property was taken and the
fair market value of the property remaining after the appropriation of a
portion thereof. Notwithstanding that the owner of land is not limited
in compensation to the use which he makes of his land, nevertheless it is
the market value of the land which controls. As bearing upon the question
of market value, the owner is privileged to offer evidence as to deposits of
19 Id. at 197, 197 N.E. at 194.
20 234 N.Y. 208, 137 N.E. 305 (1922).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VoL 7
MINERAL VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES
certain materials upon the land which might tend to enhance the market
value beyond the purposes for which the same was used. In the present case,
however, the values sought to be established were purely speculative and
hypothetical. They were based upon the proposition that because deposits of
clay and sand were to be found upon the land, the owner, if she should estab-
lish brick yards thereon, erect buildings and equip them with necessary
machinery for the manufacture of brick covering a period of 35 or 40 years,
and able to find a tenant who would pay her annually 10% on the sum
invested and a royalty of 40% to 60% on a possible sale and manufacture
of millions of bricks, would thereby be enabled to make a large net return
on the property. This evidence is in excess of the rule of the measure of
damages properly applicable to a case like the present one, and as suggested
was purely hypothetical and therefore improperly received. The question
in such a case is not merely whether the property is peculiarly adapted for
the special use claimed for it, even with deposits upon it such as have been
enumerated, but whether or not purchasers can be found who would pay
more for it because of the adaptability to the use to which the same might
be applied." 21
Reading & P. Ry. Co. v. Balthaser,22 deals with the method of valuation
that attempts to indicate market value by the introduction of evidence of the
value of the mineral deposits in place. This case involved the taking of 1.807
acres of land by the railroad for a right of way. At the trial it was claimed
by the owners that the property is valuable, not simply for farm land, but
by reason of limestone deposits. At the trial witnesses for the owners
testified that their valuations were based upon the value of the limestone de-
posits in place and covered up by the railroad. In holding this testimony to be
incompetent and in reversing the judgment of the lower court, the Court says:
"It is almost unnecessary to argue the incompetency of that kind of
testimony. Its character and effect were fully pointed out in the opinion of
this court in the case of Searle v. Railroad Co., 33 Pa. St. 64. We there
held that the value of the land as coal land could be allowed, but not the
value of the coal itself underneath the road. We said:
"'We do not measure the value of land by such facts. Land may have
$4,000 worth of coal per acre in it, and yet sell at $40 per acre. When a
man has to sell his property, of course, he must take the market value for it.'
"And so in this case, the value of the plaintiff's land as limestone land
was a proper subject of consideration, both by the witnesses and the jury, in
estimating the damages, but not the value of the stone under the road. Prac-
tically this distinction was disregarded when the objectionable testimony was
retained, and more of it given; and herein there was error. The doctrine of
Searle v. Railroad Co. has never been departed from, nor is it likely to be.
It is founded upon sound principles and practical common sense." 23
The sampling of cases heretofore cited represents the general judicial
feeling in the United States respecting the valuation of mineral lands for
"I d. at 218,137 N.E. at 308.
2119 Pa. 472, 13 Ad. 294 (1888).
23 Id. at 482, 13 At. at 297.
Feb. 19561
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
condemnation purposes. Hundreds of other cases have been collected but
they only reiterate the principles here announced. Extensive quotations have
been used in this article at the risk of fatiguing the reader with the thought
that the persuasive language from actual cases carries the trademark of
authority.
From the cases considered, the following general principles emerge:
1. Mineral deposits cannot be valued as merchandise separate from
the land in which they are contained.
2. Gross valuation of the mineral product in place, even after appro-
priate deductions for the cost of extracting and marketing, is not legally
acceptable.
3. Evidence of past profits from an actual operating mining enterprise
or evidence of probable future profits from a prospective enterprise are not
acceptable as substantive evidence of market value. The use of these factors
is confined solely to cross-examination to test the opinion of the valuation
witness.
4. The sole issue in a condemnation case is "market value" as that
term has heretofore been defined. This excludes speculative, hypothetical
and conjectural values. Such valuations of necessity are based upon broad
assumptions as to the quantity and quality of the deposit and more often
than not, from the economic standpoint, the imagination of the expert witness
conjures up a phantom market in which the ultimate product is to be sold.
5. The owner of the mineral bearing land is of course permitted through
his witnesses to testify to the existence of valuable deposits, to the geology
and to the probable quantity and quality of the minerals.
6. Subject to these limitations, the ultimate question for the court or
jury to decide is what a prudent buyer would pay for the condemned area
having full information as to the deposits in place.
It is common experience that much land containing mineral deposits is
valuable not for the deposit itself but for some higher and better use. This
result comes about for a variety of reasons. The deposit may be of low
grade material. There may be similar materials in the vicinity in such
tremendous quantities that the deposits themselves become the ordinary
"country rock" of the neighborhood and have, therefore, no economic value.
The deposit may be so far removed from the market that transportation costs
make the working of the deposit financially unsound. Gold has a constant
market but a federally fixed price of $35.00 an ounce, so the cost of
extracting the gold often exceeds any possible return. This is an all too
familiar problem in the gold mining industry of today. The cost of extract-
ing and processing an ounce of gold in many instances amounts to $60
an ounce and with a fixed price in the market of $35.00 an ounce
[Vol. 7
MINERAL VALUATION IN EMINENT DOMAIN CASES
it is obvious that these gold reserves will remain frozen until either
the price of gold is raised sufficiently or the cost of extraction goes down
sufficiently to strike a feasible balance between cost of production and
profitable marketing of the product. Lands containing these frozen gold
reserves are probably the outstanding example of property which is not in
any way presently enhanced in value by reason of the presence of mineral
deposits. In such a situation the highest and best use of the land condemned
would not be mining but would be some other use, such as home sites or graz-
ing land. In such a case where gold bearing lands are condemned and where
the deposit is such that with the fixed price of gold it is uneconomic to mine,
the owner is not permitted to speculate upon the possibility of an increase
in the fixed gold price or upon the possibility of a depression with its
attendant decrease in the cost of extraction. To permit the owner to so
testify, in the view of the courts, would be to countenance intolerable con-
jecture.
In those few cases today (and they are few indeed) where the gold
deposits can be economically mined, then of course the land condemned
would have an enhanced value. In such a situation, the court and jury would
and should consider the extent to which the workable gold deposits enhance
the value. The courts have recognized this in many instances. For example,
land may contain $4,000 worth of coal per acre and yet sell on the open
market at $40 per acre."4 This situation, as has been previously pointed out,
comes about through a myriad of economic and physical considerations.
Two Cases in Point
Several years ago the author was involved in a condemnation case in one
of California's mountain counties where mineral valuations were involved.
A brief recitation of some of the facts and testimony developed during this
lengthy trial might serve to place a more realistic touch upon the legal
principles heretofore discussed.
A public agency sought to condemn a 74-acre piece of ground for use
as a borrow pit, that is, a source for road building materials. At the time
of the condemnation action this property was not being actively operated
although it had been used as a borrow site during the last century as a source
of fill material and ballast during the original construction of the Central
Pacific Railroad. A portion of the 74-acre tract was mountainous and, except
for those areas which had been worked during the early railroad construc-
tion, the property was largely forested with Lodgepole Pine, Jeffrey Pine,
White Fir, Red Fir and Sugar Pine.
Because of the technical nature of the valuation questions involved,
both sides incurred considerable expense in engaging expert geological,
" Reading & Pottsville Ry Co. v. Balthaser, 119 Pa. 472, 13 Aft. 294 (1888).
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mining and valuation witnesses and in conducting physical tests upon the
property to determine the volume of aggregate material in place, its quality,
and its commercial usability. Numerous samples of the material were taken,
drillholes were put down and many clamshell excavations made. Both sides
engaged in these sampling operations and representative samples were then
sent to assay and materials testing laboratories where the samples were
subjected to numerous and highly technical tests.
The geologist who testified on behalf of the property owners estimated
that on the 74-acre parcel there existed in excess of 3,200,000 cubic yards
of aggregate material to depths which varied from 33 to 39 feet. This same
witness also qualified as a timber cruiser and testified that he measured the
commercial board footage of the standing timber. He testified to an over-all
market value of the 74-acre parcel of $198,240.30. Cross-examination of
this witness revealed the basis of this valuation testimony. It appeared that
his total timber value of $3,904.62 was arrived at by calculating the number
of board feet of each species of timber and multiplying this result by
either a fixed price per thousand board feet or a fixed price per lineal foot.
Of his total valuation, cross-examination revealed that he had allocated the
sum of $194,335.68 to natural aggregate material, which he obtained by
multiplying his calculated 3,238,928 cubic yards by a fixed price of 60
per cubic yard.
At this point the condemning agency moved to strike out the valuation
testimony of this witness on the ground that it was arrived at by an improper
method which had no relation to market value. After extensive legal argu-
ment before the court in the absence of the jury, the motion to strike was
granted and the valuation figures stricken from the record.
Subsequent witnesses for the owners avoided these valuation pitfalls and
testified as to their opinions of market value in amounts ranging from
$127,500 to $137,000.
The question of marketability of the aggregate product within a dis-
tance of an economic haul was another factor to which considerable testimony
was devoted during the trial. Witnesses produced by the property owners
testified that a demand existed for a commercial aggregate product ranging
from 200,000 to 300,000 cubic yards per year.
The cost of installing a rock processing plant was explored during the
cross-examination of various witnesses since the rock products found upon
the parcel of property condemned would require considerable processing
if they were to be used for commercial aggregate purposes other than as
simply fill material. The economic feasibility of such an operation was also
extensively explored.
The owners' witnesses who testified to market valuations and who did
not value the timber and rock deposits in place based their valuations upon
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [VoL 7
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the presence of the natural resources and what they believed a buyer would
be willing to pay for the 74-acre piece and they assumed that it would be
economically feasible to erect a processing plant at a cost of in excess of
$40,000 and assumed, further, that 200,000 to 300,000 cubic yards of
aggregate material could be disposed of annually within the area of an
economic haul. The limits of such an area, of course, are fixed by the
ton/mile cost of transport and the outer limits of the market area of the
nearest competitive plants.
At the conclusion of the case for the property owners the condemning
agency proceeded with its presentation. Among the expert witnesses
called by the condemning agency were a geologist and mining engineer,
an aggregate materials engineer, a sand-rock-gravel plant operator,
a timber cruiser and forester, a valuation engineer and a real estate appraiser.
None of these witnesses, with the exception of the valuation engineer and the
real estate appraiser, attempted to place any dollar and cents value upon
the 74-acre piece of property. The geologist and mining engineer confined
himself to an exposition of the geological history of the area and to a refuta-
tion of some of the geological theories advanced by the geologist produced
by the property owners. The geologist produced by the condemning agency
testified to his extensive investigation of the entire area in which the 74-
acre parcel was located and found that all of this area was underlain with
similar aggregate deposits. Thus, in effect, he testified that there was nothing
unique about the deposit on the 74-acre piece and that equally suitable
material was to be found throughout this area which he found to contain
nearly 125,000,000 cubic yards distributed over an estimated area of 939
acres.
Other witnesses for the condemning agency testified to extensive investi-
gations made by them with respect to past, present and anticipated demand
for aggregate products within a radius of an economic haul. Their investi-
gation disclosed that the maximum yardage which could be consumed by
private home builders, public buildings, public utilities, and all other users,
ranged between 5,000 and 10,000 cubic yards per year. The theory of
the case for the condemning agency was that because of the limited demand
in the area, any commercial aggregate operation would not be economically
feasible and that no informed buyer would purchase the condemned property
for a commercial aggregate plant operation.
It was further testified that because of the terrain of the country the
effective market would be within a 20-mile radius of the site, and that because
of the extensive and expensive processing which the natural material would
require in order to be made suitable for concrete aggregate purposes, it
would be cheaper to haul the material in from plants located outside the area.
The two witnesses for the condemning agency who testified to actual
Feb. 19561
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dollars and cents figures as to market value found that the highest and best
use of the property was not for aggregate material. Implicit in this conclusion
is the recognition that vast quantities of natural aggregate material underlay
the entire area. It is axiomatic that a practically unlimited supply and a
strictly limited demand are not productive of an economic market. This
opinion was, of course, based in part upon the findings and opinions of the
geologist and mining engineer and upon the findings and opinions of the
other aggregate experts produced by the condemning agency. These valuation
witnesses found that the highest and best use of some of the 74-acre piece
was for commercial timber, and that some was marginal grazing land, and
that the remainder had a possible use for cabin sites.
These valuation witnesses, of course, examined sales of comparable
properties in the area which were recently sold and which contained the same
type of aggregate deposit. They considered several small aggregate plant
operations which were attempted in recent times in the vicinity, all of which
proved to be economic failures; and one of them arrived at a market value
figure of $6,520 and the other expressed the opinion that the 74-acre piece
had a market value of $7,600.
Altogether some ten technical witnesses testified during the course of
this extensive trial. The jury was taken to the property for a view and
examined the various testholes and excavations and samples of the extracted
material. After closing arguments and instructions the case was submitted
to the jury and a verdict in the sum of $13,320 was returned.
It is difficult within obvious space limitations to adequately cover all
of the many facets of a trial so highly technical and involved. This brief
summary has been made, however, simply to illustrate the valuation problem
and its pitfalls as well as the legal aspects and considerations in a mineral
valuation case. So far as can be determined this case was one of first
impression in the trial courts of California and, in making its rulings upon
the many objections and motions, the trial judge was compelled to rely
largely upon the general legal principles which we have attempted to set
out in this article.
Another case of some interest in the field of mineral valuation was
fairly recently before one of the trial courts in California. A public agency
was condemning some 20 acres out of a larger ownership of nearly 300
acres for the purpose of relocating a highway. The right of way was acquired
in order to build a freeway to which there would only be limited rights of
access. This was a case in which not only the value of the land taken was
required to be assessed by the jury but since it was the taking of only a
part of a larger parcel, the issue of severance damages to the remainder
was also necessarily involved.2" The right of way cut into a large mountain
"5 CALIF. CODE CIV. PRO. § 1248.
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of volcanic origin, the principal rock of which was an andesite material
containing hornblende crystals. This type of rock is used for building
purposes and for various types of rock walls, fireplaces and ornamental
construction. A number of old quarries existed in the vicinity and the owner
of the property affected had quarried some material from the mountain.
However, it appeared that less than 5,000 cubic yards of this rock had been
removed in a period of 25 years. Both sides presented geological testimony
as to the quantity and quality of the rock deposits. Considerable evidence
was introduced with respect to the market for this type of material as well
as freight rates to the principal centers of distribution which were San Fran-
cisco and Los Angeles. This deposit was located in California near the
Oregon border. The expert witnesses for the property owner first attempted
to estimate the number of cubic yards on the 300 acres and then proceeded
to multiply this yardage by a fixed price per yard. This testimony, however,
was not permitted. One of the mining engineers for the property owner
attempted to arrive at his estimate of value and damages by another method.
He estimated that on the affected property were 500,000 tons of rock, that
production would be $5 per ton and freight rate to the nearest market would
be $20 per ton, or a total f.o.b. market of $25 per ton. He then estimated
that the selling price at the market would be $40 per ton, leaving a profit
of $15 per ton. He then extended this calculation by multiplying the profit
of $15 per ton by the 500,000 tons of rock and arrived at a figure of
$7,500,000. Immediately his testimony was vulnerable to a motion to strike
but he chose not to rest upon this calculation but testified that his market
value figure for the land taken and the damages to the remainder by reason
of his claimed inability to successfully operate the quarry because of the
limited access freeway cutting across the toe of -the mountain would be
$130,000. It was never made completely clear, however, how the figure
of seven and one-half million dollars mysteriously shrunk to a figure of
$130,000 which, he said, was his estimate of the market value of the
property being taken and the damages to the remainder. This witness simply
reiterated that was his opinion and he would go no further in his explanation.
Other witnesses for the property owner testified to various sums ranging
up to $150,000. The mining engineers for the condemning agency set out
to demonstrate that by actual calculation on this mountain, including that
portion of the mountain owned by the defendants, there existed in the form
of quarriable rock some 2,817,371,484 cubic yards and that within the
total acreage owned by the defendants there existed 8,426,832 cubic yards
of which the right of way of the highway would cover only 29,282 cubic
yards. These witnesses also demonstrated that the fact that only 5,000 cubic
yards of material had been excavated over a period of 25 years resulted from
the fact that the remoteness of this deposit and its staggering magnitude
gave it no measurable economic value. At the rate of removal it would take
over 14 million years to exhaust the nearly 3 billion cubic yards of rock.
Of course, these figures are astronomical and yet they illustrate the
dangers in trying cases of this character. Let us take, for example, the
testimony of the mining engineer who testified for the owners to a figure of
$7,500,000 based on 500,000 tons. If this same calculation were applied
to the nearly three billion cubic yards which the mountain contained, the
entire mountain would be worth something in the neighborhood of $45,000,-
000,000. If the federal government could lay its hands upon a half dozen
or so of these magic mountains, the national debt would disappear overnight.
The facts of this case dramatically illustrate the reason why the courts
will not accept testimony based upon the measured units of minerals multi-
plied by a fixed price per unit. If this were to be permitted the wealth of
the country, on paper at least, would be utterly incalculable.
The condemning agency's valuation witnesses placed a market value
upon the acreage being taken and the damages to the remainder at approxi-
mately $1,200. After some three weeks of trial the jury finally resolved this
controversy by returning a verdict totaling $1,750 covering both the value of
the property condemned for the right of way and the damages to the remain-
ing tract.
Conclusion
It is in the application of abstract legal principles to the actual trial
of a mineral valuation case that the practical workings of these rules can
be observed and their usefulness evaluated. It is, of course, true that in
the field of eminent domain generally many items of actual damage are not
compensable. Condemnation proceedings compel what is sometimes an
involuntary sale on the part of the property owner. Yet, under the fair
market value concept he is protected in that he is entitled to be compensated
in an amount which a present voluntary sale to an informed buyer would
bring. It is arguable in the case of frozen gold deposits which could not
be profitably extracted under present conditions, that the owner, if allowed
to remain in possession of his property for several decades, might be able
to realize a fortune when and if either the price of gold should be revised
upward or the cost of production should drop. As we have seen, however,
the law does not favorably countenance speculative or conjectural values
and therefore this speculative possibility of future fortune is something
which the owner cannot properly claim or realize. All property is held
subject to the paramount right of the government to appropriate it for the
public use upon the payment of just compensation. The loss of the possi-
bility of future speculative gain as a result of condemnation proceedings
has become one of the inherent risks of ownership. It is sometimes argued
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that these rules work great hardship on property owners who must give up
their holdings presently with the consequent loss of future possible gain. Yet
it is equally valid to say that the hardship compounded out of thousands
of condemnation proceedings would work untold injury on the public if,
in addition to present market value, compensation were required to be paid
for future speculative values which might or might not ever come in existence.
Valuation experts encounter difficulty enough in attempting to fix present
market values. A gigantic guessing game would result from attempts to fix
future values, the existence of which depends wholly upon unforeseeable
events which lie concealed in the realm of the as-yet-unhappened.
Mining engineers in general probably would accept the premise that
in the case of unexploited mineral deposits, those deposits can be considered
for valuation purposes only to the extent that they enhance the value of
the land and that they cannot be valued separately from the land. Many
of these same mining engineers, however, find it difficult in condemnation
of an operating mining property which has a history of profitable produc-
tion to accept the same premise. In such a case, the typical mining engineer
would tend to base value upon a calculation of the gross mineral product
less proper allowances for extraction, operating and marketing costs.
There is no doubt, of course, that this initially appears to-be a logical
approach to the valuation of an operating mining property, particularly
where the deposit is metallic, such as gold, silver, lead, zinc, copper, etc.-
Yet from what we have seen, the law appears to make no distinction between
unworked mineral deposits, whether metallic or non-metallic, and operating
mining properties where the metallic or non-metallic deposits are being
worked. However, the cases with remarkable unanimity hold that in either
situation the existence of valuable minerals can be taken into account if and
in so far as they enhance the market value of the land itself. This rule has
been applied indiscriminately to all types of mineral deposits, such as lime-
2 2T 2812stone," ore, gold, 8 coal,29 sand and gravel," and stone."
It should be emphasized that what have been outlined here are the rules
which have been devised by the courts for condemnation proceedings.
Outside the field of condemnation, mining properties are sold with some
reference to speculative considerations. The same considerations would
apply in the sale of any going business, of whatever type, in the open market.
The peculiar rules relating to condemnation, however, exclude consideration
" Seattle & M. Ry. Co. v. Roeder, 30 Wash. 244, 70 Pac. 498 (1902).
" Montana Ry. Co. v. Warren, 6 Mont. 275, 12 Pac. 641 (1887), aff'd, 137 U.S. 348 (1890).
" Twin Lakes Hydraulic Gold Mine Syndicate v. Colorado Midland Ry. Co., 16 Colo. 1, 27 Pac.
258 (1891).
19 St. Louis Belt & Terminal Ry. Co. v. Carlton Real Estate Co., 204 Mo. 565, 103 S.W. 519
(1907).
Benson v. Horman, 188 Minn. 252, 247 N.W. 4 (1933).
Ross v. Palisades Interstate Park, 90 NJ.L. 461, 101 At. 60 (1917).
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of and compensation for many consequential losses which may result upon
the condemnation of property. The denial of compensation for such conse-
quential losses and the strict adherence to the "market value" yardstick is
probably rooted in the belief that somewhere there must be an adjustment
and a compromise between the interest of the public and the award of com-
plete indemnity to the property owner. The rationale of many of the decisions
with respect to consequential losses seems to be that many of such alleged
losses can only be estimated through conjecture and, for this reason, evidence
on these matters should be excluded.
The general condemnation rule is that compensation cannot be made
for such matters as loss of business,32 the expense of removing removable
fixtures and personal property from the premises,33 or profits which may
be lost by reason of the necessity of moving and setting up in a new loca-
tion. 4 There is no doubt that such elements would be considered by a
property owner in determining whether, and at what price, to sell in a strictly
open market transaction. No doubt if the owner is to be made completely
whole for the loss consequent upon the seizure of his property by the
sovereign, such elements should properly be considered. But the courts have
generally held that they are not to be reckoned as part of the compensation
for the property appropriated by the government.3"
Therefore, just as the real estate appraiser in estimating the "market
value" of any going enterprise must do, the mining engineer in the case of
the operating mineral property must construct his valuation estimate within
the framework of the applicable rules of law. Otherwise, his testimony will
be vulnerable to many legal objections and motions to strike. A profitably
operating mineral property would certainly seem to have a greater market
value than a similar non-operating property with like deposits. The one has
been proved, while the other remains a potential. The mining engineer
may, therefore, properly make his estimate of market value with reference
to what he believes the operating property would bring at a sale in the open
market, bearing in mind of course that some elements of value and loss
cannot be taken into account in condemnation proceedings.
Mineral valuation cases are not distinguished by their simplicity, and
preparation for trial before a lay jury requires the greatest cooperation
among the geologist, the mining engineer and the lawyer. The lawyer will
in all probability be uninitiated in the technical language of mining and
2 People v. Ricciardi, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943) ; Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber
Co., 171 Cal. 392, 153 Pac. 705 (1915); Long Beach v. Wright, 134 Cal.App. 366, 25 P.2d 541
(1933) ; Morris v. San Francisco, 59 Cal.App. 364, 210 Pac. 824 (1922).
" People v. Auman, 100 Cal.App.2d 262, 223 P.2d 260 (1950) ; Los Angeles v. Signal Realty
Co., 86 Cal.App. 704, 261 Pac. 536 (1927).
Los Angeles v. Klinker, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).
3 United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
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geology and should eagerly submit himself to a short but intensive period of
instruction at the hands of his experts. He can, however, use his own initial
lack of information to advantage by remembering that the jury will also
be uninformed in this branch of science, and great effort should be made
to have the experts when testifying attempt to use the language of the layman,
so far as possible.
The primary task of the lawyer is to plan his own court presentation
in conformity with the rules of law controlling the admissibility of evidence.
He must be vigilant to see that the testimony of his own witnesses is not
vulnerable to objections and motions to strike, for nothing weakens the case
in the jury's eyes more than the repeated granting of motions to strike and
the subsequent admonition to the jury to disregard the stricken testimony.
For those who wish to pursue the matter further some additional cases
on the subject of mineral valuation are appended in the footnote.36
It hardly requires saying that this discussion is by no means exhaustive
of this somewhat obscure field of the law, which in itself is contained within
a shrouded branch of jurisprudence. It would here serve no useful purpose
to express personal opinions as to what the law might or should be. Objective
treatment requires only an honest search to discover what the law is. The
search in itself may be rewarding because the expanded use of the power
of eminent domain throughout the country will more and more involve
mineral properties. The lawyer and the mining engineer will best serve the
cause of justice if they have an understanding of the present status of judicial
thinking in this field. Some purpose has been served if these few faltering
steps on one of the less celebrated byways of the law has stirred the interest
of only one mining engineer and one lawyer.
"Mastering the lawless science of our law,
That codeless myriad of precedent,
That wilderness of single instances."
Aylmer's Field
-Alfred, Lord Tennyson.
"United States v. 620 Acres of Land, 101 F. Supp. 686 (W.D. Ark. 1952) ; Strouds Creek &
M. Ry. Co. v. Herold, 131 W. Va. 45, 45 S.E.2d 513 (1947) ; United States v. 5 Acres of Land,
50 F. Supp. 69 (E.D. N.Y. 1943) ; Ringwood Co. v. District Water Supply Commission, 109 N.J.L.
165, 143 At]. 369 (1928); Atlanta Terra Cotta Co. v. Georgia Ry. Co., 132 Ga. 537, 64 S.E. 563
(1909) ; Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Davis, 58 W. Va. 620,52 S.E. 724 (1906).
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